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: Using Tinker to Regulate Off-Campus Student Cyberbullying

WHEN THE SCHOOL BULLY ATTACKS IN THE LIVING ROOM:
USING TINKER TO REGULATE OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT
CYBERBULLYING
Karly Zande"
“It lowers my self esteem. It makes me feel really crappy. It makes me walk
around the rest of the day feeling worthless, like no one cares. It makes me very,
very depressed.”
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1.
Share Your Cyberbullying Story, http://www.cyberbullying.us/shareyourstory.php (last visited Mar. 3,
2009) (chronicling the experiences and feelings of real-life victims of cyberbullying).
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INTRODUCTION
Everyone remembers the school bully from their childhood years, even if they
were never a victim themselves. He was the one who was unbelievably large for
his age and surrounded by myths of flunking several grades, or who picked on the
first graders by the monkey bars on the playground, or the popular student who
spread rumors about classmates.2 His victims could only escape him by retreating
to the refuge of their home as soon as the final school bell rang.
However, the Columbine shootings led to massive changes to how the law
deals with incidents of so-called “traditional bullying.”3 In the ten years since that
tragedy, advancements in technology have changed interactions among students.
Instead of rushing to the playground and local restaurants after school, today’s students “meet up” with their peers on social networking websites, such as MySpace
________________________

2.
It is not the author’s view that all bullies are male; he is merely being used for simplicity.
3.
Many states have adopted some version of an anti-bullying statute. For instance, Louisiana defines
bullying as:
[A]ny intentional gesture or written, verbal, or physical act that . . . [a] reasonable person . .
. should know will . . . harm[ ] a student or . . . plac[e ] a student in reasonable fear of harm
to his life or person or damage to his property; and . . . [i]s so severe, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or abusive educational environment for a
student.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13 (2006). This is similar to many states’ anti-bullying laws. See, e.g., I ND. CODE
ANN. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE R. § 18-2C-2
(2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (2009). Only nine states, however, include provisions in their bullying code to
sufficiently handle cyberbullying and other online harassment. See ARK. C ODE ANN. §§ 6-18-514 (2007) (stating
bullying can occur by a “written, verbal, electronic, or physical act”); C AL. EDUC . CODE § 32261 (West 2009)
(including bullying by electronic acts); (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2009) (asserting that bullying could occur
by telephone, or computer, or internet); I OWA CODE § 280.28 (2007) (including electronic acts in its definition);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (West 2008) (including “cyberbullying” in its definition); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
121A.0695 (West 2009) (including electronic acts in its definition); O KLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-100.3 (West
2009) (including electronic communications); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.356 (West 2009) (including cyberbullying in its definition); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-120 (2006) (also including electronic acts in its bullying definition).
Three other states allow schools to punish cyberbullies, but only for intentional acts, which does not adequately
protect student victims. See infra Parts III.D.2 and IV.B; see also MD. CODE ANN., EDUC . § 7-424 (West 2009);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-26 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285 (West 2009). An additional four states
allow schools to intervene only if the cyberbullying occurs on the school grounds or computers, which also fails to
protect student victims, and account for the fact that most cyberbullying occurs off-campus. See infra Parts III.C
and IV.B.2.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-2, 137 (LexisNexis
2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2007); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2008).
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and Facebook, and instant messaging programs. 4 In response to this constant
availability of technology, bullies have adapted their tactics to the times, giving rise
to an emerging problem known as cyberbullying.5
For example, Ryan Halligan, a seventh grader, was tormented online in the privacy of his own living room by schoolmates who used instant messaging software
to mock and ridicule him, causing him to take his own life. 6 Eighth grader Jeff
Johnston also committed suicide after a group of hackers destroyed an online game
that he had invented and replaced it with a website full of malicious comments
about him. 7 Kylie Kenney was forced to change schools after a group of classmates created a website entitled “Kill Kylie Incorporated.”8 Those students also
sent her harassing emails and phone messages, and used instant messaging to
spread rumors that she was a lesbian. 9
The continuous access to other students and the anonymity offered by these
technologies has created a constant problem both for school administrators, in trying to prevent cyberbullying and discipline perpetrators, and for victims, who are
just as vulnerable at home as they are in school. 10 The law has failed to keep pace
with today’s technology, and is currently inadequate to protect victims of cyberbullying. 11 Until a nationwide cyberbullying regime is implemented, courts need to
give schools the authority to constitutionally intervene in cyberbullying incidents
and punish perpetrators, even when such acts occur off campus in the living rooms
of the students. 12
Accordingly, Part I of this paper will define cyberbullying and discuss its effects on victims. Next, Part II will discuss the free speech rights of students as it
stands today. Part III will then examine the current ambiguous state of the law
addressing cyberspeech and off-campus student speech. Finally, Part IV will dis________________________

4.
Frontline: Growing Up Online (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2008) (calling social network sites
the “hub” of teenagers’ social lives); see also ROBIN M. KOWALSKI ET AL., CYBER BULLYING: BULLYING IN THE
DIGITAL AGE, 3 (2008) (referring to the Internet as the “digital communication backbone of teens’ daily lives”).
5.
See Growing Up Online, supra note 4 (chronicling how technology has changed the lives of today’s
students); see also KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 3-5 (describing how technology has led to the problem of cyberbullying).
6.
See Growing Up Online, supra note 4. Ryan’s father details how Ryan’s online “friends” from school
spread rumors about Ryan being gay, how a girl Ryan liked pretended to return his affection so she could later
humiliate him, and how when Ryan told a friend he was going to commit suicide, the friend responded, “It’s about
[expletive] time.” Id.
7.
Laird Harrison, Special Report: Cyberbullying, http://www.ahealthyme.com/topic/cyberbullying (last
visited Feb. 25, 2009).
8.
Suzanne Struglinski, Schoolyard bullying has gone high-tech, DESERET NEWS, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,645194065,00.html.
9.
Id. Kylie noted that she felt “‘ashamed, humiliated and scared.’” Id.
10.
See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 35-37 (describing what school administrations are attempting to do to
prevent cyberbullying); see also Growing Up Online, supra note 4 (interviewing Anne Collier, the author of MySpace Unraveled, who stated that “there are so many devices [students] can use to connect, there are so many hot
spots and friends’ houses and libraries and cafes and schools and all these places where they can go on line where
we can’t control them”).
11.
See supra note 3, noting that only nine states’ anti-bullying statutes include a definition of bullying that
would adequately allow schools to intervene in student cyberbullying incidents. See also infra Part III for a discussion on the inconsistency of court decisions regarding cyberbullying.
12.
This nationwide regime should be similar to that in place for traditional bullying. See discussion supra
note 3 on the different state anti-bullying statutes.
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cuss how courts can empower schools to prevent and stop student cyberbullying
using the Tinker test.13 Utilization of the Tinker analysis will give school administrators and courts a workable and well-developed test for determining whether or
not schools can curtail student cyberbullying, even when such speech occurs off
campus.
I. CYBERBULLYING EXPLORED
A. Defining Cyberbullying
Cyberbullying is such a newly recognized phenomenon that there is no current
consensus on whether it is one word or two words, let alone what it entails.14 Despite an absence of widespread knowledge on the subject, cyberbullying is extremely prevalent among today’s school children, with several studies reporting
that approximately eighteen percent of students are cyberbullied during a twomonth period.15
But before one can understand the trouble courts are having in deciding how to
regulate cyberbullying, it is important to understand what it entails, and how it differs from traditional bullying. Most courts and commentators agree that it is a very
narrow part of cyberspeech, which is yet another developing area.16 In general,
cyberbullying can be described as the use of technology to humiliate, embarrass, or
otherwise bully another.17 Today’s child has numerous technologies at their dis________________________

13.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was the first decision by the U.S. Supreme Court discussing student free speech rights, and held that schools could discipline students for speech that
was materially and substantially disruptive or impinged on the rights of other students. 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
See also infra Part II-A.
14.
Many variations in spelling are seen across articles on this topic, including cyber bullying, cyberbullying (as used in this Article), and cyber-bullying.
15.
Robin M. Kowalski & Susan P. Limber, Electronic Bullying Among Middle School Students, Vol. 41,
Iss. 6, Supp. 1 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S22, S28S26 (2007). Of those, 52% were cyberbullied by a known
schoolmate, and another 36% reported that the cyberbully was a friend. Id. This data reinforced the results of
another study conducted in 2000, where 19% of the school-age children reported being the victims of cyberbullying within the prior year. Michelle L. Ybarra & Kimberley J. Mitchell, Online aggressor/targets, aggressors, and
targets: A comparison of associated youth characteristics, 45 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 1308, 131112 (2004). However, another survey, albeit less scientific and controlled than the others cited in this footnote,
reports currently 52% of those polled have been cyberbullied.
Wired Safety Cyberbullying Poll,
http://www.wiredsafety.org/cgi-bin/survey/survey.cgi?survey_name=site (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). This increase may be due to its location on a website devoted to stopping cyberbullying, which would likely attract more
cyberbullying victims.
16.
Cf. Christopher E. Roberts, Note, Is MySpace Their Space? Protecting Student Cyberspeech in a PostMorse v. Frederick World, 76 MO. KAN. C ITY L. REV. 1177, 1188-89 (2008) (naming cyberbullying as an area of
cyberspeech which that author believes should be governed by an intent test). See also infra Parts III.D.2 and
IV.B.2 for more discussion on the intent test and cyberbullying.
17.
Darby Dickerson, What is Cyberbullying?, 29 NAPSA LEADERSHIP EXCHANGE 28, 28 (2009), available at http://www.leadershipexchange-digital.com/leadershipexchange/2009spring/?pg=31. All the definitions
have similar elements in common to the definition provided in this Comment. See, e.g., Stopcyberbullying.org,
http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) (defining cyberbullying as “when a child, preteen or teen is tormented, threatened, harassed, humiliated, embarrassed or otherwise
targeted by another child, preteen or teen using the Internet, interactive and digital technologies or mobile
phones”); KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 1 (defining it as “bullying through e-mail, instant messaging (IM), in a chat
room, on a Web site (sic), or through digital messages or images sent to a cellular phone”).
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posal that they can employ to perpetrate acts of cyberbullying.18 Among others,
these include text messages, emails, chat rooms, instant messages, social networking sites, other websites, and cell phones. 19 These technologies give cyberbullies
perpetual access to their victims, and the ability to hide their true identities. 20
One notable difference between many cyberbullying definitions is an age element.21 While some definitions and scholars specify that cyberbullying describes
behavior between two adolescents, others use the term to describe incidents between two adults, or between an adult and adolescent.22 Indeed, what is perhaps
the most notorious case of cyberbullying involved the suicide of thirteen-year-old
Megan Meier, after she was tormented on MySpace by forty-nine-year-old Lori
Drew.23
Cyberbullies, like traditional bullies, use multiple methods to accomplish their
ends, some more violent than others.24 Flaming is one such technique, involving a
short online argument between two or more persons trading insults while using
offensive language. 25 It often occurs in chat rooms, on discussion boards, or on
virtual game websites.26 Harassment involves the one-sided sending of offensive

________________________

18.
See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 1-3, 46 (delineating the different technologies accessible to today’s
generation of students and how they affect students’ lives).
19.
See NANCY WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS 17-26 (2007) (discussing the various
digital technologies which can be used to cyberbully).
20.
See id.
21.
See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 43 (noting that “[t]here is also confusion surrounding the ages at which
cyber bulling may take place.”).
22.
Compare,
e.g.,
Stopcyberbullying.org,
http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) (stating that
cyberbullying “has to have a minor on both sides”) with Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 867 (2008) (noting that common
cyberbullying cases “involve students posting comments critical of school administrators and teachers to personal
webpages or social networking sites”) and Todd D. Erb, Comment, A Case for Strengthening School District
Jurisdiction to Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 265-66 (2008) (listing a
“quartet” of cyberbullying cases, three of which involved student speech directed towards a teacher or administrator). See also KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 43 (stating that when an adult is involved, the incident should be called
cyber-harassment and not cyberbullying).
23.
See,
e.g.,
Parents:
Cyber
Bullying
Led
to
Teen’s
Suicide,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Story?id=3882520, (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). Lori Drew created a fake MySpace
profile masquerading as a sixteen year old boy named Josh who befriended Megan and tricked her into thinking he
liked her. Id. Drew wanted to get back at Megan for getting into a fight with her daughter. Id. After Megan
began to like Josh, he told her the world would be better off without her, that she was fat and ugly, and that she
was not a nice person. Id. Megan killed herself that night. Id. Drew was convicted of three misdemeanor counts
of computer fraud. Jennifer Steinhauer, Verdict in MySpace Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 27, 2008), at A25,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/us/27myspace.html. This conviction was later tentatively dismissed by a federal district court judge. See, e.g., Tom McCarthy & Scott Michels, Lori Drew, MySpace Suicide
Hoax
cConviction
Thrown
Out,
ABCNEWS.COM,
July
2,
2009,
available
at
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=7977226&page=1.
24.
See, e.g., KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 46 (noting that, like traditional bullying, cyberbullying occurs in
varying extremes, and is sometimes harder to identify than others); WILLARD, supra note 19 at 5 (stating that
categories of cyberbullying often “overlap or [are] interrelated”).
25.
See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 47. Willard, however, questions whether this category should be
included as cyberbullying, since bullying is generally categorized by behavior over time, instead of the short-lived
disputes characteristic of flaming. WILLARD, supra note 19, at 5.
26.
See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 47.
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messages to a targeted individual over a period of time. 27 It usually occurs over
email, instant messaging, and text messaging. 28 Denigration is the dissemination of
cruel, harmful information about a target, where the target is generally not the recipient of the information.29 This information is usually spread over email, instant
messaging software, or posted online at a website. 30 Impersonation occurs when a
cyberbully gains access to the victim’s password, logs on to one of the victim’s
accounts, and sends out hurtful messages or posts hateful comments purporting to
be the victim. 31 Another method, outing and trickery, involves the cyberbully pretending to befriend the victim in order to learn personal, and often embarrassing,
information which the victim believes will be kept private, and then spreading that
information to others.32 Finally, exclusion/ostracism is when the cyberbullying
victim is purposefully excluded from groups, chat rooms, or websites, due to a
change in password, omission from a buddy list, or from being ganged up on by
other members.33
A related concept is that of cyberbullying by proxy, which occurs when the cyberbully gets a third party to do the bullying for him or her.34 Often, the third party
is unaware that he or she is being used to cyberbully a victim. 35 Unsurprisingly,
some forms of cyberbullying by proxy overlap with the cyberbullying methods of
denigration and impersonation. For instance, the cyberbully can enlist the third
party to send harassing emails or instant messages from the victim’s personal accounts, or the cyberbully can hack into the third party’s accounts and use those
accounts to transmit attacks.36 More commonly, however, the cyberbully will get
others to engage the victim in “Notify Wars,” where the accomplices press a “notify” or “warning” button in the software, which will wrongly alert the victim’s instant messaging service, chat room, or email server that the victim is writing objectionable content.37 Once the service or chat room administrator receives a certain
number of warnings, the victim’s account is terminated.38 Cyberbullying by proxy
can also occur when the cyberbully urges the others to send harassing messages to
the victim. 39 The cyberbully provokes the victim until the victim responds, either
in an emotional or harassing message, email, or some other form. The cyberbully
________________________

27.
See WILLARD, supra note 1919, at 6-7. Note that harassment involves one or many protagonists, but a
victim who does not send offensive messages back. Id. This distinguishes harassment from flaming, where both
sides send offensive messages. Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. at 7. Examples include sending digitally altered photographs or websites targeting a specific student. KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 48. Kylie, from the Introduction, was the victim of denigration. See supra note
9 and accompanying discussion.
30.
See WILLARD, supra note 19, at 7-8.
31.
See id. at 8. Willard points out that the cyberbully does not necessarily steal the password, noting that
it is common practice among teen girls to exchange passwords as a pledge of friendship. Id.
32.
Id. at 9. It is this method by which Ryan Halligan from the Introduction was tormented by numerous
cyberbullies, including a girl he liked. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
33.
See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 49-50.
34.
Darby Dickerson, Cyberbullies on Campus, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 51, 59 (2005).
35.
KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 44.
36.
Id. at 45.
37.
Id. at 44.
38.
Id.
39.
Dickerson, supra note 34, at 59.
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then forwards the victim’s response on to either friends, to embarrass the victim, or
to an authority figure, in an attempt to get the victim in trouble. 40
B. Differences Between Cyberbullying and Traditional Bullying
In the aftermath of the Columbine tragedy, the mindset of the public towards
bullying changed from being begrudgingly tolerant to actively preventing bullying
from occurring.41 Ironically this same earlier tolerance of traditional bullying is
prevalent again today in incidents of cyberbullying.42 Cyberbullying shares three
common characteristics with traditional bullying: it is aggressive, it involves an
imbalance of power between the players, and the bullying is repeated over a period
of time. 43 However, differences in how these characteristics play out in a cyberbullying event makes cyberbullying more difficult to regulate than traditional bullying.44
Traditional bullying usually involves a physically stronger bully and a weaker
victim. 45 However, technology enables an otherwise powerless child to subject a
physically stronger or older child to fear and abuse that the cyberbully would be
unable to assert in a face-to-face confrontation. 46 Technology can also obstruct a
victim’s ability to trace the comments back to the bully. 47 Thus, a cyberbully, unlike a traditional bully, can use technology to hide behind anonymity and inspire
additional fear.48 Cloaked by this anonymity, the cyberbully is enabled to say
harsher, more destructive things than a traditional bully due to his physical removal
from the situation.49 Since tone, inflection, and facial expression are lacking in
________________________

40.
Id.
41.
See Erb, supra note 22, at 259 (averring that “[t]he viewpoint that harassment and bullying by one’s
peers is relatively harmless and a rite of passage for school children changed drastically” after the Columbine
shootings). Horrified viewers were glued to their television for days after the Columbine shooting, and outraged
that the two teen shooters supposedly committed this horrendous act in response to being victims of bullies at
school. See id.; see also Stephanie Chen, Debunking the Myths of Columbine, 10 Years Later, CNN, Apr. 20,
2009, available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/20/columbine.myths/. In response to this outrage,
schools have enacted numerous measures to make students safer, and have petitioned for stronger bullying statutes
to allow schools to intervene in bullying incidents. Kathy Bushouse & Marc Freeman, Columbine made schools
take notice on 10-year anniversary, Safety now paramount, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 2009, at B1.
42.
See, e.g., Jonathan Stayton, Cyber bully drove schoolboy to attempt suicide, THE ARGUS, Feb. 18,
2008, available at http://www.theargus.co.uk/news/2053716.cyber_bully_drove_schoolboy_to_attempt_suicide
(stating that the cyberbully told all of his friends and teachers of his attacks about a fellow student yet no one
intervened). Similarly, Ryan Halligan’s classmates were aware he was being cyberbullied, but did nothing to stop
it. See Growing Up Online, supra note 4.
43.
KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 61-62.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 62.
46.
Id. (noting that “a child who might wield little power over a victim face-to-face may wield a great deal
of power . . . in cyber space”).
47.
Id. at 65.
48.
Id.
49.
See
Glenn
Stutzky,
Stutzky’s
Cyberbullying
Information,
http://www.ippsr.msu.edu/Documents/Forums/2006_Mar_ CYBER_BULLYING_INFORMATION_2006%20-%20Provided%20by%20Mr.%20Glenn%20Stutzky.pdf http://glennstutzky.com/id14.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2009) (stating that “[i]f I’m bullying you face to face I can see the impact it’s having on you . . . and I might back
off and end it seeing that I’ve got you good. This technology removes me from being able to see the impact of my
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online conversations, a cyberbully might not even be aware of the harm he or she is
unintentionally causing the victim. 50
Additionally, while traditional bullying involves multiple, separate acts between the players, one act of cyberbullying can be spread over and over again to
thousands of people, and cause far more damage. 51 Degrading comments posted
online are accessible to people across the globe, including relatives, friends, and
future employers, who may mistake the cyberbullying comments as truth. 52 While
acts of traditional bullying are instantaneous, and can be easily forgotten by observers over time, cyberbullying acts posted on the Internet spread rapidly and are
left up for a potentially infinite length of time, increasing the duration of the acts,
and causing an extended period of embarrassment and shame. 53
It is not uncommon for victims of cyberbullying to also be victims of traditional bullying during school hours.54 But, unlike the victims of traditional bullying,
cyberbullying victims have no safe haven to run home to after school. 55 Because
students are constantly accessible to each other via the Internet and cell phones, a
cyberbully can reach into the victim’s own living room to torment him or her. 56
Further, where a bully at school must operate under the watchful eyes of teachers,
lunchroom monitors, and other faculty, there is no one supervising his or her actions in cyberspace. 57 There is no one to punish the cyberbully, except for his or
her parents, who may be blissfully unaware of their child’s online activities.58
actions and so lends itself to greater cruelty”). See also KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 65 (referring to this as “the
phenomenon of disinhibition”).
50.
See, e.g., id. at 65 (including the comments of one child who describes how you can become an accidental cyberbully by thinking you are making a joke and inadvertently hurting someone’s feelings due to the lack
of tone and expression). Likewise, it is almost certain that no cyberbully, or traditional bully, would intend to
cause death, or suicidal ideations, such as those experienced by many victims. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
51.
See KOWALSKI, supra note 4 at 62 (stating that although “there may have been only one initial [cyberbullying] act, it may have been perpetrated through many people and over time”).
52.
See,
e.g.,
CBC
News
In
Depth:
Cyberbullying,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/bullying/cyber_bullying.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) One victim described the humiliation from having such an increased audience:
Rather than just some people, say 30 in a cafeteria, hearing them all yell insults at you, it’s up there for 6 billion
people to see. Anyone with a computer can see it . . . . And you can’t get away from it. It doesn’t go away when
you come home from school. It made me feel even more trapped.
Id.
53.
See, e.g., Stutzky, supra note 49 (noting that cyberbullying “lengthens the duration of . . . torment”
compared to traditional bullying).
54.
See, e.g., Carroll, infra note 77 (describing the plight of a high school girl who was the victim of cyberbullying at home, and “berated . . . in person during school hours”).
55.
See Bob Meadows, The Web: the Bully’s New Playground, PEOPLE, Mar. 14, 2005, at 153 (emphasizing the difficulty cyberbullying victims have in escaping the perpetrator). The mother of a cyberbullying victim
aptly described that “[w]hen [the bullying] is on the computer at home, you have nowhere to go.” Id.
56.
See Mike Wendland, Cyber-bullies make it tough for kids to leave playground, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov.
17, 2003, at 1A (describing the accessibility of today’s teens due to the technology available to them).
57.
Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Fact Sheet: What You Need to Know About Online Aggression 1, 2 (2008), available at http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_fact_sheet.pdf (stating that
“supervision is lacking in cyberspace”).
58.
See id. (noting that the lack of supervision renders many incidents of cyberbullying “outside of regulatory reach”). According to one survey, although ninety-three percent of parents think they know what their child
is doing online, approximately forty-one percent of children reported that their parents didn’t know what activities
they did online. KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 91. Kowalski points out that parents are often not members of social
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While some may argue that the victim could escape merely by turning off her
cell phone or signing offline, this is not the reality for today’s students. Technology has become so entwined with teenage lives, as a vehicle for both completing
schoolwork and hanging out with friends, that logging off is simply not a viable
option. 59 Thus, cyberbullies effectively “have their victims on an electronic tether.”60
Perhaps surprisingly, while boys are generally the perpetrators and victims of
traditional bullying, it is girls who are more likely to be on both ends of cyberbullying.61 However, it appears that the boys who cyberbully others do so more frequently than their female counterparts.62 Cyberbullying also peaks during the middle school years, while most traditional bullying occurs during elementary school
years.63
An intriguing difference between cyberbullying and traditional bullying is the
role that bystanders play. Traditional bullying is witnessed by a number of bystanders who play a variety of different roles. 64 While some bystanders might become accomplices and assist in the bullying, others may try to help the victim get
out of the situation.65 Another group may indirectly engage in the bullying by
laughing, egging the bully on, or otherwise reinforcing the bully’s behavior.66 The
largest group of bystanders will likely witness the event silently without assisting
either side or reporting the bullying to a teacher.67
Comparatively, cyberbullying bystanders can be either more or less of a presence depending on how the cyberbully chooses to operate. 68 It is possible that a
bystander to a cyberbullying act could participate in the bullying, defend the victim, or choose to ignore it, just as with traditional bullying.69 Unlike traditional
bullying, the bystander could unwittingly become part of the bullying, such as in a
cyberbullying by proxy scenario, if the cyberbully utilizes the bystander’s screen
name or email account to harass the victim. 70 Troublingly, research also suggests
networking websites, and are unfamiliar with the technologies that their children are using, making it more difficult to monitor their child’s online activities. Id.
59.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text, describing how pivotal technology is in the lives of teens
today. See also Melissa McNamara, Teens Are Wired . . . And, Yes, It’s Okay, CBS NEWS, June 13, 2006, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/09/gentech/main1698246.shtml (reporting that “[t]echnology is so
integrated into teens’ lives that it’s difficult to measure where their offline life begins and their online life ends”).
60.
Wendland, supra note 56 (quoting Glenn Stutzky, a clinical professor at Michigan State University’s
School of Social Work and school-violence specialist).
61.
See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 78-79 (noting that “cyber bullying overall seems to occur more frequently among girls than among boys”) (citation omitted).
62.
Id. (describing survey results that showed more boys acknowledging that they cyberbullied someone at
least once a week, and several times a week, than the girls surveyed who admitted to cyberbullying).
63.
Id. at 80 (discussing the results of a scientific survey that authors conducted).
64.
WILLARD, supra note 19, at 44 (noting that bystanders play varying roles “within the bullying dynamic”).
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 63. However, even the silence by these bystanders can be taken as passive
support by the bully, or cause the victim to feel even more humiliated. Id. at 63-64.
68.
See WILLARD, supra note 1919, at 44 (suggesting that more research should be done on the role of
bystanders in cyberbullying).
69.
KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 64.
70.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009

9

Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3

112

Barry Law Review

Vol. 13

that bystanders to cyberbullying are more likely to become cyberbullies themselves
in the future, due to the lack of physical requirements associated with traditional
bullies and anonymity offered by the internet. 71 Thus, it is imperative that schools
make preventing cyberbullying a priority.
Although cyberbullying attacks may sound insignificant to an outside observer,
these acts can have permanent, serious effects on victims that cannot, and should
not, be ignored.72 These effects are often more devastating than those experienced
by victims of traditional bullying. 73 In addition to feeling lonely, humiliated, and
insecure, like victims of traditional bullying, cyberbullying victims also experience
heightened feelings of anger, frustration, and depression. 74 In some cases, these
emotions can be so strong as to lead to suicidal ideations and even suicide attempts.75 Victims also experience trouble concentrating, exhibit lower self-esteem,
and demonstrate physical symptoms, such as headaches and abdominal discomfort.76 Furthermore, cyberbullying victims who know that the cyberbully is another
student at school often fear and avoid attending school in an effort to evade face to
face contact with the bully. 77 Victims may be in constant fear for their safety at
school and become preoccupied with both avoiding the perpetrator and ensuring
that their surroundings are safe.78
All of these effects culminate in the victims’ inability to form positive relationships with others and to function normally in their academic and familial responsibilities.79 Stories shared by cyberbullying victims attest to the fact that cyberbullying can decrease students’ grades and performance in school.80 Even when the
________________________

71.
Id. Kowalski believes that all of these factors coupled together will make it easier for bystanders of
cyberbullying to become desensitized to cyberbullying, and to become one themselves. Id.
72.
Wendland, supra note 56 (quoting Professor Glenn Stutzky as saying that “‘while these comments may
seem silly to people who have matured, they are very devastating to the young people on the receiving end.’”).
See also Hinduja & Patchin, infra note 77, at 2 (stating that the effects of cyberbullying are not limited to hurt
feelings that can be easily disregarded and can permanently damage the psyche of many adolescents).
73.
See, e.g., Meadows, supra note 55; see also Wendland, supra note 56.
74.
See Hinduja & Patchin, infra note 77, at 1-2; WILLARD, supra note 19 at 33-34 (listing the emotional
problems experienced by cyberbullying victims).
75.
See WILLARD, supra note 19, at 34. Unfortunately, this is what happened to Jeff Johnston and Ryan
Halligan when they could no longer stand being cyberbullied. See supra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text.
76.
See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 85 (stating that the effects of cyberbullying are similar to traditional
bullying, and can include “depression, low self-esteem, helplessness, social anxiety, reduced concentration,” and
other negative emotions); see also WILLARD, supra note 19, at 34 (listing psychosomatic symptoms a cyberbullying victim may experience).
77.
See, e.g., Sameer Hinduja, Ph.D. & Justin W. Patchin, Ph.D., Cyberbullying Research Summary: Emotional
and
Psychological
Consequences
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_emotional_consequences.pdf. Another report found that 400,000
adolescents nationwide try to avoid attending school because they are being bullied, and approximately one out of
three of those children are being cyberbullied. Kathleen Carroll, Schools step up efforts to stop cyber bullying,
Jan. 4, 2009, available at http://www.northjersey.com/education/ bigpicture/37055169.html (quoting J. Frank
Vespa-Papaleo, the director of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights).
78.
See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 77, at 2 (noting that victims are constantly surveilling the landscape
of cyberspace or real space to guard against problematic personal encounters).
79.
See id. (stating that a victim’s ability to focus on academics, family matters and responsibilities, and
prosocial choices is compromised to some extent).
80.
See, e.g., Meadows, supra note 55 (sharing several teen accounts of cyberbullying, and noting that
more common than suicide, which one cyberbullying victim committed, cyberbullying “caused victims’ grades to
plummet and kids to seek psychiatric help and change schools”); see also Amanda Burgess-Proctor, Ph.D., et al.,
Cyberbullying Research Summary:
Victimization of Adolescent Girls 1, 1-2, available at
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cyberbullying acts occur off campus, in the privacy of the perpetrator and victim’s
respective homes, it can have long-lasting and destructive effects on the victim
inside the school.81
In sum, cyberbullying is a growing problem in schools, just like traditional bullying before the tragic Columbine shootings. Because of its severe effects on students, schools should be allowed to intervene in student cyberbullying cases and
prevent further harm to victims of cyberbullying. However, unlike incidents of
traditional bullying, cyberbullying remains essentially unregulated in most states. 82
II. STUDENT FREE SPEECH ISSUES
Although a school may wish to intervene in cyberbullying incidents between
students, its authority to do so under the First Amendment is currently unclear.
While most states have adopted anti-bullying statutes, only a few of those clearly
give schools jurisdiction to act in cyberbullying situations. 83 Thus, the school must
look to court decisions to ensure that it is not violating the free speech rights of
cyberbullies by disciplining them. This section details the current state of the law
governing the free speech rights of students.
A. Supreme Court Authority on Free Speech in the Schools
Student rights to free speech in a public school are governed by a quartet of
Supreme Court cases spanning the last four decades. The first, Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, involved a group of students who
were suspended for wearing black armbands to voice their opposition to the Vietnam War.84 The Supreme Court remarked on the need to balance the First
Amendment rights of students with the ability of school administrators to make and
enforce rules governing appropriate student conduct. 85 Thus, it held that the school
could quash student speech when it was materially or substantially disruptive, or
when it violated the rights of other students. 86 Since the armbands in Tinker were
passive, and neither disrupted the classroom nor impinged on the rights of other
http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_girls_victimization.pdf (22.7% of female victims in this study reported feeling affected at school, even though the cyberbullying took place off- campus). Depriving victims of
their educational opportunities in this way is also one of the harms recognized in Title IX sexual harassment lawsuits. See, e.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999) (noting that
Title IX requires that “students must not be denied access to educational benefits and opportunities on the basis of
gender”).
81.
See, e.g., Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 77, at 2 (describing the difficulties cyberbullying victims have
in going to school after being cyberbullied).
82.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
83.
Id.
84.
393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
85.
Id. at 506-07 (stating that while “[i]t can hardly be argued that . . . students . . . shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” schools must be able “to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools” under the First Amendment).
86.
Id. at 512-13 (citing Blackwell v. Issaquena Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (discussing past
decisions in lower courts, and noting that student speech which “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech”).
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students, the Court ruled that the school violated the students’ right to free
speech.87 Commentators suggest that Tinker is the most important case regarding
student free speech rights, and that the later decisions are merely exceptions to the
Tinker standard.88
The second case in the student speech quartet, Bethel School District Number
403 v. Fraser, involved a high school student who described a fellow student’s
candidacy for student body vice president using a series of sexual metaphors during
a school assembly.89 The Court noted that Fraser’s speech was lewd and offensive,
and upheld the school district’s suspension.90 In so ruling, the Court limited the
scope of Tinker, and gave schools the authority to curtail student speech when its
expression was lewd, offensive, and contrary to the school’s mission, even when
not disruptive. 91
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the third school speech case, further
chipped away at Tinker.92 The school administration in that case deleted two articles from the school newspaper concerning student pregnancy and the effect of
divorce on students. 93 Administrators were concerned that the topics were not appropriate for younger students and that some of the anonymous students in the article could be identified.94 The Court reiterated that a school could curtail otherwise un-censorable speech that conflicted with the school’s educational mission
and values. 95 This decision was partly because the student speech could be perceived as “school-sponsored.”96 Thus, school-sponsored speech became another
exception to Tinker.
The most recent case, Morse v. Frederick, further expanded the rights of school
administration to curtail student speech. 97 The school planned an event during the
school day, allowing students to leave class to observe the Olympic torch passing
________________________

87.
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.The Court noted that the district court had found no evidence of disruption caused by the armbands, or that the armbands had interfered with the rights of other students at the school. Id.
at 509. It further observed that a school-issued memo on the suspension of the students had made no mention of
any actual or potential disruption. Id.
88.
See, e.g., Kellie A. Cairns, Morse v. Frederick: Evaluating a Supreme Hit to Students’ First Amendment Rights, 29 PACE L. REV. 151, 151 (2008) (stating that “the Court has steadily continued to carve out exceptions to [Tinker]”).
89.
Bethel Sch. Dist. Number 403 v. Fraser , 478 U.S. 675, 684-90 (1986). Fraser depicted the other student as “‘firm in his pants,’” and a person who goes to the “‘climax’” for his peers. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
90.
Id. at 683 (stating that the “pervasive sexual innuendo . . . was plainly offensive . . . to any mature
person”).
91.
Id. at 684-90.
92.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
93.
Id. at 263.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 260 (holding that “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school”).
96.
Id. at 261 (maintaining that “[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).
97.
127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2008); see also Cairns, supra note 88, at 151 (arguing that the Supreme Court
made a mistake in carving an exception out of Tinker with Morse v. Frederick).
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through the town. 98 Frederick, a student at the school, did not show up for classes
that morning, but came to see the torch pass.99 He stood off campus with classmates and held up a fourteen-foot wide, homemade banner with the phrase “BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS.”100 When Frederick refused to take down his banner, the school
principal suspended him. 101 The Court rejected Frederick’s argument that the
school could not punish his actions, as he had not been in attendance at school that
day. 102 However, the Court did note that there was no established boundary for
when the school speech rules apply. 103 It also found that the school principal did
not violate Frederick’s First Amendment rights by prohibiting him from displaying
the banner because it could reasonably be seen as promoting drug use, and the
school could curtail such speech.104
All of the cases in the Supreme Court quartet reiterate the original standard set
forth in Tinker: schools are allowed to discipline students for speech that causes a
substantial disruption in the classroom or interferes with the rights of other students.105 However, the quartet leaves many questions unanswered, including
whether off-campus student speech that reaches onto the school campus can be
curtailed by school administrators. This makes application of the Supreme Court
precedent to cyberbullying cases difficult and unpredictable.
B. Fleshing Out the Tinker Test
Tinker gave the lower courts an adaptable test to use when analyzing student
speech cases. Since then, it has been largely up to the lower courts to flesh out the
nuances of the Tinker test and to determine what constitutes substantial disruption
and what speech impinges on the rights of others. 106 This section discusses cases
interpreting Tinker that are relevant to cyberbullying.
1. Material and Substantial Disruption under Tinker
The first prong of the test laid out in Tinker allows schools to curtail student
speech consistent with the First Amendment when the speech causes a substantial
and material disruption inside the school. 107 Since this prong has been well devel________________________

98.
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. The school arranged for students to be dismissed from class for a specified
period of time, under the supervision of teachers and administrators, to view the event. Id.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at 2624 (stating that Frederick could not “‘stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school
hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.’”) (citations omitted).
103.
Id. The Court asserted that while there “is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts
should apply school-speech precedents . . . [it would not be] based on these facts.” Id.
104.
Id. at 2625.
105.
See supra Part II.A.
106.
The Tinker Court failed to define what behavior would constitute material and substantial disruption,
and how large a portion of the classroom the speech would have to affect. See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note
22, at 844. The case also neglects to define what types of behavior would impinge on others’ rights, as well as
what rights those students possessed in the first place. Id. at 847. See also supra Part II.A.
107.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
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oped by courts interpreting it, school administrators can find a wealth of information on which they can draw to determine if they can constitutionally prohibit certain student speech, including cyberbullying.
Even before Tinker, several courts found that a school could prohibit student
speech that caused an actual disruption inside the classroom. 108 Both Burnside v.
Byars and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education involved students
wearing freedom buttons at school to show support for African American voting
rights.109 Both lower courts that considered the matter rejected the students’ arguments that the prohibition violated the students’ free speech rights. 110 However,
because the freedom buttons in Blackwell caused actual disruption in the school,
the Fifth Circuit upheld the prohibition against wearing the freedom buttons in that
case on appeal, where in Burnside it did not.111
However, neither Tinker nor the First Amendment requires schools to wait until actual disruption occurs within the school. Instead, administrators have a duty
to prevent any such disruption from taking place. 112 In order to constitutionally
curtail speech by forecasting disruption, the Tinker Court examined whether the
school could point to specific facts which made it reasonable to believe that material and substantial disruption could occur on campus.113
Since then, other courts have expanded on what criteria schools can use to
forecast material and substantial disruption. Schools cannot, for instance, forecast
material and substantial disruption due to students refusing to stand for the Pledge
of Allegiance, but may base it on speech with sexual connotations. 114 It is well
established that schools can reasonably forecast disruption based on prior incidents
outside the school.115 However, the prior events must have occurred relatively recently in time. 116
________________________

108.
See Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM . U. L. REV. 1129
(2009) (describing the Fifth Circuit cases Burnside and Blackwell which were decided just prior to Tinker, and
cited in its opinion). The Tinker Court cited these cases only in the final draft of its opinion, lending the ultimate
test that it announced greater clarity than it had articulated in previous drafts. Id. at 1160.
109.
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363
F.2d 749, 750-52 (5th Cir. 1966).
110.
Burnside, 363 F.2d at 744; Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 752.
111.
Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749; Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 753-54. The court compared the two in its Blackwell opinion, noting that in Blackwell, the facts were much different than in Burnside which involved “no disruption of classes or school routine.” 363 F.2d at 753.
112.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. See also Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that,
under Tinker, school administrators “have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances” which could result
from student speech).
113.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
114.
See Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting school’s claim that they could
forecast material and substantial disruption when a high school student refused to stand for the Pledge of Allegiance); Broussard ex rel. Lord v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1535 (E.D. Va. 1992) (noting that children are
“easily distracted by language with sexual connotations”).
115.
See, e.g., Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 1970) (school did not violate the First
Amendment by prohibiting anti-war buttons because of a history of violence at the school regarding other buttons); Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir. 1972) (school could prohibit student from wearing a Confederate flag jacket to school because there was a tense, racial situation at the high school, and it could reasonably
anticipate disruption based on past racial violence); Karp, 477 F.2d at 176 (school was justified in forecasting
substantial and material disruption when a student organized a walkout during an awards presentation and invited
the media); Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 488 (D.S.C. 1997) (school could reasonably
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Additionally, some courts hold that the school must be able to demonstrate a
close nexus between those events and the speech in question. 117 For instance, in
Sypniewski v Warren Hills Regional Board of Education, the court found that the
school could not use prior incidents involving a gang called the “Hicks” to forecast
disruption from a Jeff Foxworthy “You Might Be A Redneck If . . .” T-shirt that a
student wore to school. 118 Similarly, in Chambers v. Babbitt, the court found that
there was not a sufficient nexus between a prior racial incident and a student’s
“Straight Pride” T-shirt by which the school could reasonably forecast disruption. 119
2. Impinging on the Rights of Other Students under Tinker
The second prong of Tinker allows schools to curtail student speech when it
impinges on the rights of other students. 120 Particularly for incidents of cyberbullying, this test could assist school administrators in showing that prohibition of the
cyberbully’s speech was constitutional.121 Many court cases have expanded on the
Tinker standard governing actual disruption and forecasting material and substantial disruption.122 Curiously, though, very few courts have addressed the Tinker
Court’s statement that a school can regulate speech that impinges on the rights of
other students, leaving this standard regrettably ambiguous. 123
In Nixon v. Northern Local School Board of Education, the Southern District
Court of Ohio grasped the opportunity to develop this test in ruling that a school
forecast material and substantial disruption from a Confederate flag jacket based on racial tensions and prior
disruptive incidents); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 2000) (school
could reasonably forecast disruption when a student drew a Confederate flag on a paper in class because there was
a history of racial violence at the school).
116.
See Barber ex rel. Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 857 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding
that a school could not reasonably forecast that a T-shirt stating George W. Bush was an “International Terrorist”
would cause disruption based on events that occurred in response to Operation Desert Storm ten years earlier).
117.
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that there
needed to be some identifiable relationship linking the past disruption and the present speech in order for the
school to be able to forecast disruption).
118.
Id. at 274-75. The court noted that a mere “association” between the prior events and the speech was
not enough, because such a limited standard could lead to an almost unfettered authority to the school district to
curtail student speech on a weakly premised connection. Id. at 257. Although the words “Hick” and “Redneck”
had similar meanings, there was no evidence here that “Redneck” had ever been used to refer to the Hick gang
before, or that the student’s shirt was intended to promote bigotry inside the school. Id.
119.
145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072 (D. Minn. 2001). In the preceding school year, a series of racially-charged
fights broke out in the school when a student wore a Confederate flag bandana. Id. at 1070. The court noted that
the only factor in common between that incident and curtailment of the “Straight Pride” T-shirt was that the shirt
and bandana were both articles of clothing. Id. at 1072. This, it held, was not a sufficient nexus to forecast violence based on sexual orientation from violence based on race. Id.
120.
Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
121.
See infra Part IV.C.2.
122.
See supra Part II.B.1.
123.
See, e.g., Andrew Canter & Gabriel Pardo, Comment, The Court’s Missed Opportunity in Harper v.
Poway, 2008 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 125, 126 (2008) (stating that when the court denied certiorari to Harper v.
Poway, it lost the chance to answer the question of whether it is “possible for a student’s words and writings alone
to ‘invade the rights of others?’”). See also Harvard Law Rev. Ass’n, Ninth Circuit Upholds Public School’s
Prohibition of Anti-Gay T-Shirts, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1694 (2007) (noting that there is not universal recognition that this is a separate prong of the Tinker test, and most courts “treat the likelihood of ‘material disruption’ as
dispositive when considering bans on political speech and symbols”).
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could constitutionally prohibit a student from wearing a T-shirt reading “Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is a lie! Abortion is murder!”124 The court expressly recognized that schools could, under Tinker, restrict student speech that interfered
with the rights of other students. 125 Noting the dearth of case law developing this
test, the court interpreted Tinker to mean that students in the school maintain both
the right to security and the freedom to be left alone. 126 Since the court concluded
that this T-shirt did not violate those rights, it held that the actions of the school
were unconstitutional.127
Another case addressing this prong of Tinker, however, found that a similar Tshirt did impinge on the rights of other students. 128 A student attended school
wearing a shirt reading “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL.”129 In holding that
the school could constitutionally prohibit the student from wearing the shirt, the
Ninth Circuit noted that it relied solely on the provision of Tinker, which allows
schools to prevent speech that interferes with the rights of others. 130 The court observed that this shirt collided with the rights of other students in the “most fundamental way,” which includes the right to be secure from both physical and psychological attacks.131 The court determined that speech against groups which have
been “made to feel inferior[] serves to injure and intimidate them, as well as to . . .
interfere with their opportunity to learn.”132 This case, however, is not controlling
because the Supreme Court subsequently vacated it as moot. 133 Additional courts
have also recognized the right of students to feel psychologically secure under
Tinker.134
In sum, these cases, and others interpreting Tinker, give schools fairly wide latitude to curtail student speech under the First Amendment. 135 Tinker has withstood many scenarios and interpretations, and has prevailed as a superior test ba________________________

124.
383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
125.
Id. at 974 (“It is true that, according to Tinker, schools can regulate speech that invades on the rights of
others.”). However, the court noted that it could find no cases allowing the schools to curtail student speech based
solely on this prong of Tinker. Id.
126.
Id. (stating that “invading on the rights of other students entails invading on other students’ rights to be
secure and to be let alone”).
127.
Id.
128.
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1177-84 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549
U.S. 1262 (2007).
129.
Id. at 1171.
130.
Id. at 1175. Lack of sole reliance on this prong of Tinker in other cases was pointed out in Nixon barely
over a year prior. See supra note 125.
131.
Poway, 445 F.3d at 1178 (stating that “[b]eing secure involves not only freedom from physical assaults
but from psychological attacks that cause young people to question their self-worth and their rightful place in
society”).
132.
Id.
133.
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). Had the Supreme Court merely denied
certiorari, the case could still be used as controlling case law.
134.
For example, the Tenth Circuit held that, despite any evidence of potential physical violence, exhibiting
the Confederate flag could reasonably be seen as interfering with the rights of students to be let alone. West v.
Darby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit also previously held that
vulgar terms may impinge on those same rights of students without any instance of physical attacks. Chandler v.
McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).
135.
See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 22, at 865-66 (commenting that after Morse v. Frederick,
school administrators have many ways in which they can constitutionally curtail student speech).
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lancing both the free speech rights of students and the interest of the schools in
educating and protecting their students. It has also proven to be an adaptable test,
and, if adopted by the courts, should provide schools additional guidance on how to
analyze the murky and complicated scenario of the free-speech rights of student
cyberbullies.136
III. THE CYBERBULLYING DILEMMA
A review of relevant case law uncovers little precedent on cyberbullying cases,
and, indeed, cyberspeech cases in general. 137 As with traditional bullying cases,
this scarcity is likely due to most cases settling out of court, coupled with the fact
that cyberbullying is only recently attracting the public’s attention.138 More troublesome is that what little precedent exists regarding both off-campus student speech
and cyberspeech is riddled with contradictions. 139 This makes predicting how
courts will treat cyberbullying, and thus advising clients, especially difficult. Cyberbullying cases are further complicated by the fact that most cyberbullying acts
occur off campus, arguably beyond the school’s authority.140 Even the lower courts
have bemoaned the paucity of direction given to them in deciding off-campus student speech cases.141 School officials are left uncertain as to which speech they can
and cannot curtail without exposing themselves to liability, making them more
likely to settle cases instead of litigate. 142
Because of the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court on how to treat offcampus student speech and cyberspeech, courts in different jurisdictions have applied inconsistent tests to the cases that have come before them. These tests employ approaches ranging from holding that schools cannot curtail off-campus student speech that arrives on campus, to utilizing a completely different constitutional approach under a “true threat” analysis, to applying several variations of Tinker.
This variety of approaches among the courts illustrates the need for a standardized,
________________________

136.
See infra Part III.
137.
See, e.g., KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 165 (noting that court decisions regarding cyberbullying are
“scant”).
138.
Id. at 164-65.
139.
See infra Part III.A-C.
140.
See Tracy L. Adamovich, Return to Sender: Off-Campus Student Speech Brought On-Campus By
Another Student, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2008) (stating that the courts have given “little guidance” on
this issue despite an “abundance of cases” regarding free speech rights of students with off-campus speech).
Because of the increasing availability and accessibility of technology, it is likely that these cases will increase in
frequency. Id. at 1113.
141.
See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619-20 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing the various
standards applied to off-campus student speech, and stating how commentators are “[f]rustrated by these inconsistencies” and are “calling for courts to more clearly delineate the boundary line between off-campus speech entitled
to greater First Amendment protection, and on-campus speech subject to greater regulation”).
142.
See, e.g., Kara D. Williams, Note, Public Schools vs. MySpace & Facebook: The Newest Challenge to
Student Speech Rights, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 707, 730-31 (2008) (stating that “[s]chool officials have admitted to not
knowing what students’ speech rights are,” especially when applying to social networking sites and other cyberspeech) (citation omitted); see also Tresa Baldas, As ‘Cyber-Bullying’ Grows, and So Do Lawsuits, N AT’L L.J..
(Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1197281074941 (noting that school districts
are fearful that if they curtail student cyberbullying they will be sued for violating student free speech rights, and if
they do not stop that speech that they will be sued for failure to act).
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adaptable test for courts to apply in cyberbullying cases, such as Tinker, that reflects the shrinking distinction between on- and off-campus speech due to today’s
technology.143 This section details the Circuit Courts’ split regarding the freespeech rights of students in off-campus student speech and cyberspeech cases under these varied approaches.
A. Courts Holding Off-Campus Speech Cannot be Curtailed by the
Schools
Some scholars argue that off-campus student speech should not be subjected to
analysis under Tinker, even if the speech is brought on campus by another student
or a third party.144 Several courts have adopted this approach. For instance, in
Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School District the New York
Supreme Court refused to apply Tinker to an offensive student newspaper article
because it was written and distributed off campus, holding the article was beyond
the reach of school administrators.145
In Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, the Fifth Circuit also had to rule
on off-campus student speech that was brought on campus by a third party. 146 In
reaching its decision, the court summarized a series of cases both following and
refusing to apply Tinker in off-campus student speech cases.147 The court noted
that the line between on-campus speech, subject to school curtailment, and offcampus speech, receiving full constitutional protection, was unclear.148 However,
it declined to apply Tinker to this set of facts, finding that the drawing in question
was off-campus speech that only accidentally made its way on campus. 149 A feder________________________

143.
Some may argue that it does not matter whether students in different jurisdictions have different rights,
and thus there is no need for a standardized test. However, since free speech is a First Amendment right under the
Constitution of the United States, students in all jurisdictions should have uniform rights regarding what speech is
and is not allowed in school.
144.
See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 22, at 882 (stating that students should not be accountable for
off-campus speech which is brought on-campus by another student). This reflects the analysis under the intent
test. See Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students’ Rights: The Need for an Enhanced First Amendment
Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 129, 143-44 (2007) (arguing that
courts should not be able to use a pure Tinker analysis to curtail off-campus student speech, and advocating the
adoption of an intent test).
145.
607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d. Cir. 1979) (holding that the “First Amendment will not abide the additional
chill on protected expression that would inevitably emanate from” school administrator’s regulation of off-campus
speech).
146.
393 F.3d at 608. Fourteen-year-old Adam Porter drew a violent sketch at home of his high school
exploding, accompanied by racial slurs and other offensive language. Id. at 611. Adam showed the drawing only
to his mother and younger brother. Id. Two years later, Adam’s younger brother brought the picture to school and
showed it to a bus driver. Id. School officials, alarmed over the graphic content of the drawing, suspended both
Adam, for making the picture, and his younger brother, for possessing it on campus. Id. at 612.
147.
Id. at 619-20.
148.
Id. at 618 (“The line dividing fully protected ‘off-campus’ speech from less protected ‘on-campus’
speech is unclear, however, in cases such as this involving off-campus speech brought on-campus without the
knowledge or permission of the speaker.”).
149.
Id. at 620 (holding that since the drawing was “composed off-campus, displayed only to members of
his own household, stored off-campus, and not purposefully taken by him . . . or publicized in a way certain to
result in its appearance at EAHS” the drawing was entitled to full constitutional protection).
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al district court in Washington held similarly in a case analyzing a student’s website in Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415.150
These cases illustrate the very real possibility that a court may hold that
schools cannot discipline student cyberbullies for speech that originates off campus. The cases also demonstrate the current uncertainty as to the school’s jurisdiction over off-campus student speech, and exemplify the need for courts to adopt
clear standards to govern future cases.
B. Applying a True-Threat Analysis
The Eighth Circuit, seemingly believing that off-campus speech should be censored by the schools but unsure under what standard, applied a different constitutional approach in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District.151 The majority
opinion omitted any discussion of Tinker, and analyzed the letters at issue, authored by a student at home, under a “true threat” analysis.152 The “true threat”
analysis looks at whether the speech in question involves a threat of violence such
that it loses constitutional protection. 153 The court ultimately found for the school
because of the brutal nature of the letter, deciding that the letter constituted a true
threat with no protection under the First Amendment. 154 The dissenting opinion in
Pulaski, however, pointed out that the majority failed to consider the effects stemming from the speech arriving on a school campus. 155
While the “true threat” analysis may be a possible tool in the school’s arsenal,
it is unlikely to meet the needs of a school hoping to stop student cyberbullying, as
most cyberbullying acts will not rise to this level of threat of violence. 156 Indeed,
most student speech in general would fail to satisfy the heightened threshold of a
“true threat” analysis. Perhaps that is why most courts, other than Pulaski, have
failed to adopt this standard. Instead, it would be better for the courts to adopt a
________________________

150.
92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (noting, after explaining the Tinker standard, that
“[a]lthough the intended audience was undoubtedly connected to Kentlake High School, the speech was entirely
outside of the school’s supervision or control.”)
151.
306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002). J.M., an eighth grader, wrote two violent and terrorizing letters to K.G.,
a girl who had broken up with him at the start of the summer. Id. at 619. The letters expressed J.M.’s plans to
molest, rape, and murder K.G. Id. Although J.M. willingly told K.G. about the existence of the letters over the
phone, it was ultimately a third party who brought the letters on campus and gave them to K.G. to read. Id. at 61920. Yet another student, who was present when K.G. read the letters, reported J.M. to school officials, who expelled him. Id. at 620.
152.
Id. at 622-27.
153.
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706-07 (1969) (holding that a true threat fell outside the
protections of the Constitution). However, the Court did not define what constituted a true threat. Pulaski, 306
F.3d at 622.
154.
Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 627.
155.
Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion “fail[ed] to consider the unique circumstances of speech in a school setting”). Using a test involving both a “true threat” and Tinker analysis, the dissent
concluded that the school did have jurisdiction to punish the student for writing the letters, even though he did so
off campus. Id. at 633-35. However, he also opined that the school’s punishment was unduly harsh and should
not be upheld. Id.
156.
See, e.g., Wendland, supra note 56. Examples of cyberbullying acts include attacking someone’s
sexuality by calling victims gay or a lesbian, ridiculing their appearance or clothes, or spreading other rumors. Id.
Professor Glenn Stutzky of Michigan State University notes that these often childish statements are devastating to
victims because of their maturity level. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009

19

Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3

122

Barry Law Review

Vol. 13

more flexible test, such as Tinker, which gives schools a lower-threshold level on
which they can act.
C. Courts Using a Tinker Analysis in Off-Campus Student Speech Cases
Since Tinker is well established, many courts and scholars believe that both
off-campus and student cyberspeech cases should be analyzed under Tinker.157 The
first inkling that off-campus student speech is subject to the same standards as that
occurring on-campus can be found in Tinker itself. In the majority opinion, Justice
Fortas states that out-of-class speech that causes substantial disruption in the classroom, or impinges the rights of others, does not receive protection under the First
Amendment.158
The majority of courts ruling on whether schools can censor off-campus student speech have applied some form of the Tinker analysis. 159 In particular, Tinker
has been used to analyze student newspapers created off campus160 and student
websites.161 This seems consistent with the trend of giving escalating authority to
schools to curtail student speech under the First Amendment across the Supreme
Court student speech quartet.162 However, when the Supreme Court was presented
with the recent opportunity in Morse v. Frederick to delineate the school’s jurisdiction over off-campus speech (or lack thereof) and eliminate inconsistencies in the
various tests used, it instead only further complicated the analysis.163
Although student Joseph Frederick’s banner was displayed off campus, the
Court both identified and quickly dismissed the issue of the boundaries of offcampus student speech by simply stating that Frederick was at school.164 Frederick, however, was not in attendance during morning classes that day and was
________________________
157.
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 142, at 724 (arguing that adopting a new test for cyberspeech would be
problematic, overboard, and not applied by the courts); Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment,
and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WISC. L. REV. 1213, 1238 (2003) (noting that
Tinker should apply to off-campus cyberspeech because of a lack of physical borders on the Internet).
158.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. Justice Fortas opined that:
“[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason -- whether it stems from time, place, or type
of behavior --. . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others
is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” Id. (emphasis added). However, this statement, as used in the courts thus far, has been largely interpreted as referring to incidents on the playground, school bus, or other places connected to the school. Indeed, four of the states with electronic provisions in
their anti-bullying statutes have limited it to a similar school setting. See supra note 3.
159.
Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Many courts have applied the
Tinker standard in evaluating off-campus student speech later brought on-campus by persons other than the speaker.”); see also Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that it used
Tinker because “[t]he overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed student speech [whether on or off campus)]
in accordance with Tinker.”).
160.
See, e.g., Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 975 (5th Cir. 1972); Sullivan v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (5th Cir. 1973).
161.
See infra Part IV.B.
162.
See, e.g., Adamovich, supra note 140, at 1090-95 (tracing the Supreme Court student speech decisions
and commenting on the increasing power of the school board apparent in each decision).
163.
See Roberts, supra note 16 at 1180 (noting that in allowing Principal Morse to discipline Frederick for
his off-campus banner, the Court is laying “a framework for school officials to restrict more student speech than
ever before,” especially cyberspeech).
164.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text. In so deciding, the Court missed the opportunity to provide guidance on off-campus student speech to the lower courts which were hoping for it. See supra note 141.
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standing off of school property among both students and non-students. 165 What
could have potentially been ruled an off-campus speech case was brought within
the jurisdiction of the school as on-campus speech, further eradicating the difference between on- and off-campus student speech. 166
Similarly, students’ constant access to technology is also making it more difficult to judge which speech occurs on- and off-campus.167 Students using the Internet as a forum for their speech are facing increasing difficulty keeping that speech
off school grounds, even if they intend to do so.168 For instance, in J.S. v Bethlehem
Area School District, this issue was especially apparent when the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that a school could not discipline a student for a webpage he
created at home. 169 Analyzing the student’s First Amendment claim under Tinker,
the court determined that because the student accessed the website at school, the
website was on-campus speech, despite being developed in the student’s bedroom. 170 The problem of technological boundaries was similarly prevalent in Coy
v. Board of Education of North Canton City Schools over another student’s website.171 The federal district court in North Dakota reached the opposite result from
J.S. over whether a website was on- or off-campus speech and ruled that the Tinker
standard applied to the website despite the fact that it was off- campus speech. 172
Another student webpage was the subject of analysis in Beussink v. Woodland R-IV

________________________

165.
Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393
(2007). The court acknowledges Frederick’s uncontradicted account that he had not attended school on that day,
that he was across the street from the school campus, that the Olympic Torch relay was attended by many nonstudents in the community as well as students from his high school, that schools were released from classes and
did not have to attend, did not have to stay near a designated area of students or with their teachers (with the exception of one gym class), and that school officials made no attempt to keep students from leaving the area to go
home. Id.
166.
See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 16, at 1178 (hypothesizing that Morse extends the schools’ jurisdiction
off campus).
167.
See supra Part III.B.
168.
See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 22, at 868 (noting that “no one knows quite where the limits to
the school’s authority lie” in off-campus cyberspeech cases).
169.
807 A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. 2002). J.S., a middle school student, created a series of linked web pages
disparaging his teachers and principal. Id. In addition to offensive language, the website encouraged students to
contribute money to hire a hitman to kill his algebra teacher. Id. The court first applied a true threat analysis, and
determined that the website did not constitute a true threat. Id. at 859-60 (noting that while in poor taste, the
website did not indicate a real intention to inflict harm on the teacher).
170.
Id. at 864-65 (“We hold that where speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is
brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be considered on-campus
speech.”). Because of the impact on the targeted teacher, and the fact that the website was a “hot topic” at school,
the court held that the website materially and substantially disrupted the school, and the school’s expulsion was
upheld. Id. at 868-69. The targeted teacher reported being afraid someone would actually kill her, and feeling
anxious and stressed. Id. at 852. She suffered headaches, became depressed, lost sleep and weight, and exhibited
memory problems. Id. These symptoms prevented her from both interacting socially with others and forced her to
take a medical leave of absence from school. Id.
171.
205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 795 (N.D. Ohio 2002). A student created a website at home, containing pictures
of three classmates and a series of insults under a section labeled “Losers.” Id. The court observed that while
objectionable, none of the material on the website could be considered obscene under Fraser. Id.
172.
Id. at 799-800. It then noted that the defendants could point to no evidence that the website created
disruption within the school, and thus denied the school’s motion for summary judgment. Id.
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School District.173 A federal district court in Missouri again analyzed the case under Tinker’s material and substantial disruption standard. 174
In sum, courts have widely accepted the Tinker disruption test for on-campus
student speech and used to analyze many instances of off-campus student speech.
Thus, it is definitely one of the tests a court will consider adopting for instances of
off-campus cyberbullying.
D. Courts Applying a Hybrid Approach to Tinker for Off-Campus Student
Speech
Even in applying the Tinker test, many courts and scholars suggest the need for
something besides material and substantial disruption, or an infringement on other
students’ rights in off-campus speech cases.175 Particularly, one line of precedent
examines whether there is a sufficient nexus between the speech and the forecast of
disruption such that the school can constitutionally curtail the speech. A complementary set of cases considers the intent of the speaker, asking whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would end up on campus.
1. Finding a Nexus Before Applying Tinker
The first of these hybrid approaches searches for a nexus between the offcampus student speech and the forecast of disruption, just as in Sypniewski and
Chambers.176 This test was utilized by the court in Layshock v. Hermitage School
District.177 The federal district court in Pennsylvania looked for a nexus between a
mock MySpace page created by the student and the forecasted disruption before it
applied the Tinker standard.178 Another MySpace page was analyzed by a different
federal district court in Pennsylvania in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School
District.179 Reflecting on the enormous role technology is playing in students’
lives, which is causing student speech to arrive on campus with increasing frequency, the court concluded that schools have the right to censor off-campus student

________________________

173.
30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998). A high school junior created a homepage containing
vulgar language about his school, teachers, and administrators. Id.
174.
Id. at 1180. Because the website had only been accessed by one student at school, and because Brandon did not share the website with any students except for that one, the court held the Tinker’s material and substantial disruption standard was not satisfied. Id. In fact, the only reason that the other student accessed the website at school was to show it to a teacher to get back at the defendant after they got in a fight. Id. at 1177-78.
175.
See infra Part III.D.1-2. See also Markey, supra note 144, at 143-44 (advocating an intent test)
176.
See supra Part II.B.1.
177.
496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Pa. 2007). A student created a mock MySpace page for his school’s
principal, filling in “silly” and “crude juvenile language” for answers to questions on the profile. Id.
178.
Id. at 595-96. Since it found that no such nexus between the speech and alleged disruption existed,
especially considering the presence of several other MySpace profiles mocking the principal, the court found the
school’s discipline unconstitutional. Id. at 600-01.
179.
No. 3:07cv585, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72685, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008). Like in Layshock,
this MySpace page also scorned the student’s principal. Id. This page, however, repeatedly referred to the principal as a pedophile and a sex addict. Id. at *1.
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speech under Tinker.180 However, it believed that a satisfactory nexus must exist
between the off-campus speech and the Tinker factors before the school could punish the student for his or her speech. 181
2. Conducting an Intent-Based Analysis
Many scholars suggest that the intent of the student speaker should be an important consideration in the analysis of whether a school has the authority to discipline students for their off-campus speech.182 The Second Circuit adopted this reasoning in several cases.
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School District, the
Second Circuit overturned its previous precedent in Thomas, holding that, under
Tinker, schools could censor off-campus student speech that arrived on campus. 183
The court, however, struggled over whether the intent of the student speaker should
be important in determining whether the school could curtail the speech. 184 The
Second Circuit then had the opportunity to revisit this question in 2008, when it
decided Doninger v. Niehoff.185 The court began its analysis by recognizing that
technology is clouding the lines between on- and off-campus speech, and then
stated that Tinker was the appropriate standard to apply in both circumstances. 186
However, it then definitively stated that schools could censor off-campus student
________________________

180.
Id. at *7 n.5 (stating that technology has blurred the line between on- and off-campus student speech,
and that since “technology allows such access, it requires school administrators to be more concerned about speech
created off campus-which almost inevitably leaks onto campus ! than they would have been in years past.”).
181.
Id. at *7. Here, the court found a satisfactory nexus between the MySpace page and the school, noting
that the student used the principal’s photograph from the school website, and created the page for the entertainment of other students at the school. Id. at *6-7. Then, despite finding that there was no material or substantial
disruption under Tinker, the court found that the school could still censor the student’s speech due to the serious
language that the student used, which, in this instance, could warrant criminal charges. Id.
182.
See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 16, at 1183-85 (suggesting that the intent of the student should be an
important factor in any analysis of off-campus speech, as otherwise you are giving too much deference to the
school board and other students); Markey, supra note 144, at 143-44 (advocating for the intent test); Dickerson,
supra note 17, at 28-29 (discussing why the intent test is the best test for cyberbullying analyses).
183.
494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007). See also supra Part III.A. In Wisniewski, a school suspended a student
upon discovering a Buddy Icon he created on AOL’s Instant Messaging program depicting a person being shot,
and the text “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” the student’s English teacher. 494 F.3d at 36. A Buddy Icon is a small
picture each AOL Instant Messaging user selects to be displayed on every conversation window that the user has
with other users.
184.
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 (noting its conflicting views over whether it must be “reasonably foreseeable that Aaron’s IM icon would reach the school property or whether the undisputed fact that it did reach the
school pretermits any inquiry as to this aspect of reasonable forseeability”). Here, however, the court found this
discussion was irrelevant, since it was reasonably foreseeable to the student that the Buddy Icon would make its
way in to the school. Id. at 39-40. This gave school administrators authority to discipline the student for his offcampus speech consistent with Tinker. Id.
185.
527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008). A disgruntled student wrote a blog entry referring to school administrators as “douchebags.” Id. The blog also contained misinformation claiming the principal had cancelled a
school event, and urged students to call or email the principal to “piss her off more.” Id.
186.
Id. at 48-49 (stating that the school’s ability to censor off-campus speech is more appropriate today
“when students both on and off campus routinely participate in school affairs, as well as in other expressive activity unrelated to the school community, via blog postings, instant messaging, and other forms of electronic communication”).

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009

23

Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3

126

Barry Law Review

Vol. 13

speech only “when it was . . . foreseeable that the off-campus expression might
also reach campus.”187
Thus, the Second Circuit embraced the intent test for dealing with off-campus
student speech. It is likely that the intent analysis will be one of the tests considered by a court deciding whether a school has the authority to stop cyberbullying,
since it gives additional emphasis to the constitutional rights of students while off
campus.
Because of the inconsistent application of standards to cases involving offcampus student speech that arrives on campus, the school’s authority to discipline
cyberbullies over such speech is unclear. As such, current law is inadequate to
protect victims of cyberbullying from its devastating effects. 188 The courts must
adopt a standardized test that gives schools the authority to discipline student cyberbullies and provides schools with a clear idea of when they can and cannot constitutionally intervene in cyberbullying incidents.
IV. TINKER SHOULD GOVERN OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT CYBERBULLYING
The cases above illustrate several ways in which courts can give schools the
authority to punish cyberbullies for their speech. First, as in Doe v. Pulaski, the
court can find that the student’s speech constitutes a “true threat” and lacks protection under the First Amendment. 189 Second, if the speech is school-sponsored,
such as a blog for a class, the courts can apply the analysis in Hazelwood and allow
the schools to curtail it consistent with the pedagogical values they are supposed to
instill. 190 If the cyberbully uses a school-issued computer or school Internet, administrators could use the analysis under Frederick or Hazelwood to stop the
speech.191 However, it is the most common type of cyberbullying, occurring off
campus through personal computers, where the school’s jurisdiction is currently
uncertain.
This section will first discuss why the definition of cyberbullying needs to be
established, given the lack of consensus in the definition, as addressed earlier. 192
Specifically, it will argue why cyberbullying should be confined to incidents occurring between two minor children. This section will then analyze why Tinker is a
superior test, and why the courts should adopt Tinker for determining whether a
school’s curtailment of off campus cyberbullying is constitutional. Finally, this
section will describe how a school can use Tinker to intervene in cyberbullying
situations.
________________________

187.
Id. at 48 (citing Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40). The court looked at the student’s intent, saying that she
created the blog to reach campus, and thus found the school could censor her speech. Id. However, this leaves
open the question of whether recklessness in making the speech would satisfy this requirement.
188.
See supra Part III.A-D; see also supra Part I.B.
189.
See supra Part III.C.
190.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 261; see also supra Part II.A.
191.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 261; Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2008); see also supra Part
II.A.
192.
See supra Part I.A.
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A. Cyberbullying Should Only Be Used to Describe Incidents Between
Two Minors
As noted previously, many legal scholars refer to incidents involving a student
and adult faculty members, such as that presented in J.S. or Layshock, as cyberbullying. 193 However, this is inconsistent with the current understanding of traditional
bullying and will lead to the formation of a test that is ill-adapted to protect student
cyberbullying victims.
from the school may be enough to curb the cyberbully’s behavior.194 Traditional bullying is used to describe incidents occurring between school-age children. 195
The law has developed other terms, such as harassment, abuse, or assault, to describe acts occurring between two adults, or an adult and child. 196 Following that
trend, especially given the similarities between cyberbullying and traditional bullying, it is logical to limit the definition of cyberbullying to the acts of school-age
children. Victims of incidents involving a child and adult, or two adults, have other legal claims available to proceed under, including defamation, cyberharassment,
and cyberstalking.197 These offenses, often more serious than the acts of a cyberbully, can be more appropriately prosecuted in the criminal system or litigated in
civil courts.198 Comparatively, it would be a waste to utilize court resources in a
cyberbullying claim when schools are in a better position to educate the cyberbully
as to appropriate online and social behavior, as well as to determine and oversee

________________________

193.
See supra Part III.B; see also supra notes 22 and 23 demonstrating the current manner cyberbullying is
being used to describe actions beyond those involving a minor perpetrator and minor victim.
194.
This is especially true given the phenomenon of disinhibition on the Internet, where a cyberbully may
not realize the extent of suffering the victim is experiencing because of his or her actions. See supra Part I.B; see
also Stayton, supra note 42 (describing the remorse felt by a student cyberbully once he was aware of the effects
of his actions on his victim).
195.
See, e.g., supra note 23. All state bullying laws regulate incidents between two school children.
196.
See generally Black’s Law Dictionary 315 (2d. pocket ed. 2001) (defining harassment as “[w]ords,
conduct, or action (usu. repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes
substantial emotional distress in that person and serves no legitimate purpose”); id. at 4 (defining abuse as
“[p]hyiscal or mental maltreatment, often resulting in mental, emotional, sexual, or physical injury”); id. at 45
(defining assault as “[t]he threat or use of force on another that causes that person to have a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact”).
197.
See, e.g., Sajai Singh, Anti-Social Networking: Learning the Art of Making Enemies in Web 2.0, 12 No.
6 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2008) (describing cyber-harassment, and cyber-stalking). Indeed, this was pointed out in a
recent incident deemed “cyberbullying” by many, when two female students at Yale Law School became victims
of a series of vicious posts on an online bulletin board, commenting on their integrity and sexual promiscuity. See
Cyber Harassment and the Law (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.onpointradio.org/2009/03/cyber-harassment. One victim claimed that the posts online harmed her
reputation and ability to secure employment. Id. The show points out that this sort of behavior is much too serious to be termed “cyberbullying.” It is a more serious defamation or cyber-harassment action. Id.
198.
This, for instance, was the fate of Lori Drew, the forty-year-old woman who used MySpace to harass
thirteen- year old Megan Meier. See, supra note 23, and accompanying text.
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appropriate punishment. 199 Oftentimes, this decorum lesson from the school may
be enough to curb the cyberbully’s behavior. 200
Giving a concrete age definition to cyberbullying also allows for the formulation of a better test reflecting the differences in maturity between children and
adults. Child victims may fear going to school, experience physical symptoms,
have low self-esteem, and exhibit decreased performance in school. 201 Adult victims of cyber-crimes are more likely to brush it off, making it unlikely that they
will experience the same effects or, if they do, at the same degree of severity as a
child victim. 202
This limitation will also allow for the courts to develop a clearer, narrower test
for dealing with instances of cyberbullying consistent with other student speech
cases. Further, it will give added protection to the free-speech rights of the student
cyberbullies themselves, taking into consideration the maturity level and ages of
their targeted victims. Such a definition would allow punishment of the cyberbully
for comments which, although seemingly silly, are hurtful and damaging to child
victims. However, if a student targets an adult victim, he or she would be allowed
a greater range of speech before it could be constitutionally censored. This reflects
the different maturity levels of the student and adult involved.
Therefore, “cyberbullying” should be defined with an age limitation, restricting
it to behavior between two minors. Any incidents involving two adults, or an adult
and a minor, should be more properly categorized as cyber-harassment, cyberstalking, or more general cyberspeech.
B. Courts Should Employ Tinker to Analyze Whether Schools can Regulate Off-Campus Cyberbullying
The Supreme Court student speech quartet leaves many unanswered questions,
notably the authority of the school administrators over off-campus student
speech.203 Already, issues regarding off-campus speech and technological boundaries have divided courts.204 Indeed, the federal district court in Pennsylvania and
________________________

199.
Teachers and school administrators, more so than children’s parents, can see the interactions between
students and are more likely to either observe or hear about incidents of cyberbullying. The importance in school
oversight has been recognized in statutes allowing schools to intervene in instances of traditional bullying. See,
supra note 24, and accompanying text.
200.
This is especially true given the phenomenon of disinhibition on the Internet, where a cyberbully may
not realize the extent of suffering the victim is experiencing because of his or her actions. See supra Part I.B; see
also Stayton, supra note 42 (describing the remorse felt by a student cyberbully once he was aware of the effects
of his actions on his victim).
201.
See supra Part I.B (explaining the effects of cyberbullying on victims).
202.
Cf. FATIMA GOSS GRAVES, RESTORING EFFECTIVE PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENTS AGAINST SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS : MOVING BEYOND THE GEBSER AND DAVIS STANDARDS 2 (2008), http://www. acslaw.org/files/Goss%20Graves%20--%20%20Moving%20Beyond%20Gebser%20and%20Davis%20Final.pdf
(stating that student victims of sexual harassment are more likely to suffer serious harms than adult victims, and
are more likely to silently tolerate harassment that adults would not). See also Wendland, supra note 56 (quoting
school violence expert Glenn Stutzky describing how cyberbullying acts that are devastating to student victims
often seem silly and immature to adults).
203.
See supra Part II.A.
204.
See supra Part III.
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the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in deciding Layshock and J.S., reached opposite conclusions over whether silently accessing a website at school constituted oncampus speech. 205 Courts in Thomas and Porter ruled that schools could not curtail
off-campus speech under any circumstances, while other courts have ruled that
schools can, provided the speech meets a variety of differing tests. 206
The lower court decisions illustrate the main problem persisting after the Supreme Court decisions: the law governing student speech has not caught up with
technology. Neither the courts, nor the anti-bullying laws of most states, provide
assurance to school administrators that they have the authority to punish studenton-student cyberbullying.207 The decisions in the courts are inconsistent, and leave
schools more confused than ever as to when they can constitutionally intervene in
acts of cyberbullying. 208 We should not wait for another Columbine-like tragedy
before we recognize the seriousness of the cyberbullying problem and take steps to
prevent it from occurring. However, until states enact laws suitable to deter cyberbullying and protect victims, schools should be given leeway to investigate cyberbullying incidents among their students and to punish student cyberbullies.
The ability of school administrators to curtail student speech occurring offcampus can be extracted from the Supreme Court decisions. In Tinker, the Court
concerned itself with balancing the rights of students to voice unpopular political
opinions with the rights of schools to maintain discipline and the rights other students to feel safe.209 In Fraser, the Supreme Court granted even more deference to
school administrators to provide students with a safe school environment. Subsequently in Hazelwood and, even more clearly in Morse, the Court further expanded
the authority of the schools to curtail student speech. 210 This trend suggests that the
schools, and not the judicial system, are more aptly suited to determine what student speech is inappropriate, and to prohibit that speech under the First Amendment.
The school is in the unique position to both identify student cyberbullies and
educate them as to proper behavior. This is, after all, consistent with schools’ pedagogical mission, as the Supreme Court explicitly recognized in Hazelwood. 211
Since cyberbullying, in both form and effect, is so similar to traditional bullying,
where the school’s authority is clearer, it seems logical that schools are the proper
party to curtail student cyberbullying as well. 212 Thus, schools should have the
authority to constitutionally discipline students for acts of cyberbullying, even
when occurring off campus.
________________________
205.
In J.S. the court held that merely accessing the website at the school made it on-campus speech, in
Layshock the court found it did not. See supra Parts III.B and III.D.
206.
See supra Part III. The same circuit that decided Thomas later held that a website created off-campus
in Wisniewski could be curtailed under Tinker. See id.
207.
See supra note 24; see also supra Part III.
208.
See supra Part III.
209.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
210.
See supra Part II.A.
211.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 261(maintaining that “[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities
so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).
212.
See supra Part I.B.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009

27

Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3

130

Barry Law Review

Vol. 13

1. A Clear Test for Cyberbullying Cases is Needed
While support for school authority to curtail and discipline students for incidents of cyberbullying can be found amongst commentators, many frequently state
that such punishment decisions can and should be left to the school’s discretion. 213
However, without the adoption of a more concrete standard for administrators to
follow, this is an unacceptable position. First, it fails to properly balance students’
free speech rights as identified in Tinker. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it
does nothing to eliminate the current uncertainty over when a school can and cannot intervene in acts of student cyberbullying without violating the First Amendment.
Further, without the delineation of a useful test, school administrators will be
uncomfortable curtailing student speech for fear of lawsuits. 214 Especially given
the current uncertainty over the off-campus free speech rights of students and the
muddled handling of student cyberspeech cases by the lower courts, it is in the best
interests of teachers, students, and courts if a clear test is set forth. Ideally, such a
test will give schools guidance as to when they can and cannot discipline students
for off-campus cyberbullying.215
Some advocate for the formulation of an entirely new test by the courts to deal
with cyberbullying, citing the problems created by technological student speech,
notably its common occurrence off campus. 216 However, implementation of a new
standard unique to cyberbullying would bog down school administrators and cause
additional burdens on courts forced to interpret its provisions. Instead, the Tinker
test, which is already widely accepted and utilized by courts and educators alike, is
the best test for courts to apply in cyberbullying cases. 217 Indeed, many courts have
already adopted and applied Tinker in a variety of cyberspeech cases. 218 Given
Tinker’s acceptance and ease of application, there is no need for development of a
separate test for a small subset of student speech cases.
Because of the balancing test in Tinker, it can adequately protect the rights of
student speakers and schools, even given the additional complications associated
with cyberbullying cases such as the off-campus nature of many cyberbullying
attacks.219 For instance, acts of off-campus cyberbullying that fail to meet the material and substantial disruption test cannot be punished by the school, thus protecting the free speech rights of the student cyberbully. However, the school can inter________________________

213.
See, e.g., Erb, supra note 22, at 282 (arguing that it is “practical” to leave this decision to the school);
see also Servance, supra note 157, at 1243 (stating that the “courts should defer to schools”).
214.
See Baldas, supra note 142 (noting that teachers are currently afraid to curtail student speech for fear of
lawsuits). Although some schools and teachers may not settle because of the protection of qualified immunity, the
expense and time of involvement of the lawsuit will serve as an effective deterrent for curtailing student speech in
many instances.
215.
See supra Part II-III; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text.
216.
See Williams, supra note 142 (stating that courts would not likely apply a new test). At least one court
has already declined to adopt a higher standard than Tinker for off-campus speech. Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch.
Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448-49 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
217.
See supra Part III.C-D.
218.
See supra Part III.C.
219.
See supra Part III.
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vene in incidents that do satisfy the Tinker test, allowing the school to fulfill its
obligation to protect its students. Additionally, adoption of the Tinker test also
adequately reflects the age limitation proposed in this Article to the definition of
cyberbullying.220 Since schools applying the Tinker standard generally lack authority over adults, limiting cyberbullying to acts between minors allows Tinker to be
used in all cyberbullying situations instead of formulating separate tests.
Further, adoption of Tinker in cyberbullying cases provides educators with a
wealth of information from scholars and courts alike, which they can utilize to
make their decisions regarding punishing student cyberbullies. 221 Specifically, the
line of precedent regarding forecasting material and substantial disruption within
the school has been fleshed-out extensively by the lower courts.222 This will give
the schools ample guidance on when they can intervene under Tinker, even when
the cyberbullying occurs off-campus. This information gives schools freedom to
discipline student cyberbullies consistently with prior cases without fearing student
lawsuits.223 Further, the prong of Tinker allowing schools to curtail student speech
that infringes on the rights of others seems especially suited to cyberbullying cases.
Although sparsely litigated, the psychological harm and fearfulness for safety experienced by cyberbullying victims seems to be the exact type of harm identified in
the few cases to address the prong. 224 Thus, cyberbullying cases are the perfect
student speech cases for the widespread acceptance of this prong of Tinker, further
supporting the adoption of Tinker in cyberbullying cases.225
Tinker is already familiar to both the schools and the courts, and will provide
the workable test that is desperately needed. Indeed, Tinker has been widely utilized even in cases involving cyberspeech and off-campus student speech, which
are uncertain areas that complicate the cyberbullying analysis.226 Thus, Tinker is
the best test the courts can adopt to govern student cyberbullying decisions.
2. Tinker Should Be Used for Both On- and Off-Campus Cyberbullying
The unique and controversial legal aspects surrounding cyberbullying, namely
the use of technology and the off-campus nature of the speech, are also easily
adaptable to the Tinker test. While the courts are certainly not unanimous in their
decisions, quite a few courts have already adopted Tinker analysis in off-campus
student speech and cyberspeech cases.227 The latest Supreme Court decision in
Morse also explicitly recognizes that the line between on- and off-campus speech is
becoming increasingly unclear.228
________________________

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See supra Part IV.1.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra II.B.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part IV.C.2.
See supra Part III.
See id.
See supra Part III.B; see also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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By deciding Morse as an on-campus speech case, despite Frederick’s physical
presence off campus, the Court further added to the confusion between which
speech is on-campus, and which speech is not. 229 It seemingly expands the jurisdiction of schools over speech that occurs outside of the confines of the school
grounds, consistent with what was perhaps the original intent of Tinker.
With today’s tech-savvy students and the constant accessibility of cell phones
and the Internet, the distinction between on- and off-campus speech only continues
to blur, making this a very different world indeed than that in which Thomas was
litigated thirty years ago. 230 When Frederick displayed his banner, he knew that it
would be seen by other students and adults, all standing off of, albeit around,
school property. A cyberbully, however, has no way of knowing where or when
his or her victim will be when the hurtful act is viewed. The constant accessibility
of victims to the cyberbully, given the availability of technology, means the cyberbully has no real way of predicting whether the victim will receive the taunts while
at home, at school, or somewhere else. This makes it increasingly difficult for
courts already puzzled over whether accessing a website on school grounds is oncampus speech to decipher whether cyberbullying is more akin to on- or offcampus speech. Like Frederick’s banner, it is hard to determine whether these acts
occur on- or off-campus. This is especially true considering teachers and administrators are often less adept with today’s technologies than their students and may be
unable to determine whether the student cyberspeech was actually sent or accessed
on campus.231
Further, unlike the websites in Beussnik and Snyder, which may have inspired
laughs from classmates, cyberbullying victims carry the off-campus speech back
with them into the school. Besides constantly fearing that they will run into their
tormentor, their academic performance in school is reduced. 232 Thus, even if the
cyberbully knows his or her victim will view the acts while at home, victims are
still bringing effects with them back into the school, where the acts may be amplified by the physical presence of the cyberbully. 233
These same arguments also illustrate why using an intent test, such as that proposed by the Second Circuit in Wisniewski and Niehoff, is illogical for cyberbullying given today’s technology. 234 Regardless of the cyberbully’s intent, because the
cyberbully does not know the physical location of his or her victim may be either at
________________________

229.
In addition, while the Court noted a distinction between on-and off-campus speech, it gave no hints as
to whether the categorization of the speech made a difference as to which analysis applied. See Morse, 127 S. Ct.
at 2618.
230.
The court in Snyder acknowledged as much in its analysis. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No.
3:07cv585, slip op. at 7 n.19 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008).
231.
See, e.g., Growing Up Online, supra note 4 (interviewing a teacher who admits to feeling like a “dinosaur” because her students know how to use technology in ways she does not).
232.
See supra Part I.B.
233.
See id. (describing the effects of cyberbullying on victims). Particularly, cyberbullying victims are
constantly on edge during the school day, trying to locate and avoid their cyberbully, leading to a greater decline in
academic performance. Id.
234.
See supra Part III.D.2 for a discussion of the intent test.
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home or at school when he or she views the cyberbullying act.235 Further, while
the cyberbully may not intend it, victims bring the effects of the cyberbullying into
the school with them. 236 The cyberbully should not be able to escape punishment
by claiming that he did not intend the victim feel afraid of him, or intend the victim’s grades to suffer. Instead, the cyberbully should have to be responsible for the
consequences of his or her actions. 237
Although an intent test approach has been championed in legal scholarship, it
has not been adopted by other courts.238 This can, perhaps, also be partially explained by the Supreme Court’s decision in Morse. Frederick’s speech occurred
off campus, among students and non-students, on a day Frederick had not been in
attendance at school. 239 By allowing the school to curtail Frederick’s speech, the
Court insinuates that the intent of the student is not an essential consideration of
which speech the school can censor.
Due to the increasingly hazy line between on- and off-campus student cyberbullying, the distinction in location should not matter for purposes of any test or
analysis. So long as the school can show that, pursuant to Tinker, the cyberbullying caused a material and substantial disruption inside the school or infringed on
the rights of another student, the school should be able to punish the cyberbully
regardless of the physical location where it occurred. Thus, Tinker is the best test
the courts can adopt to protect student cyberbullying victims, while balancing the
free speech rights of cyberbullies.
C. Using the Tinker Test in Off-Campus Cyberbullying
If courts adopt a Tinker analysis to determine whether schools can discipline
students for off-campus cyberbullying, the school still needs to satisfy one of the
prongs to avoid violating the free speech rights of the cyberbully. Under both
prongs of the Tinker test, provided the victims experience the requisite effects, the
school will be able to regulate and punish student cyberbullies. This section will
provide guidance as to how schools can proceed under each prong of Tinker.

________________________

235.
Thus, even if the court system did widely adopt the intent test, it is likely that cyberbullying would
meet that test. Because the perpetrator committed the cyberbullying acts via technology, it was reasonably foreseeable that the acts would reach campus. It is similarly foreseeable that the cyberbullying victim will carry the
effects of the cyberbullying acts into the school. The court’s interpretation, though, seems to be less stringent than
that advocated by legal scholars. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 16, at 1183-85.
236.
See supra Part I.B.
237.
This position finds additional support when examining tort and criminal law, on the basis that the
perpetrator takes his victim as he finds them, known as the eggshell skull doctrine. This doctrine was first enunciated in the English case Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669, 679, and has since been fairly universally
accepted in the United States. J ACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY D AMAGES § 11:1 (1998). Thus, if a
cyberbully chooses a victim who takes the effects of cyberbullying with him into the school, the cyberbully should
be responsible for that even if another victim would find the acts less harmful. Criminal law standards further lend
themselves to this position, in that recklessness is often a substitute for willfulness or intent.
238.
See supra Part III.D.2.
239.
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2008).
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1. School Officials Can Forecast a Material and Substantial Disruption from
Off-Campus Cyberbullying
Under Tinker, the school can curtail student cyberbullying if it causes actual
disruption within the school. For instance, as in Blackwell, if the cyberbully physically bullies the victim during school, or if people are using classroom time to discuss the cyberbullying instead of doing schoolwork, the school will be able to step
in and curtail the cyberbullying. 240
But of course schools are not required to wait for actual disruption according to
Tinker. This is especially important in our post-Columbine world. Waiting for
the actual disruption to occur may have catastrophic detrimental effects for the
cyberbullying victim. 241 Thus, it is in the best interests of the school to forecast
reasonable disruption and curtail student cyberbullying as quickly as possible.
Layshock and Snyder seem to spin the test created in Chambers and Sypniewski, looking for a nexus between the off-campus speech and the forecasted disruption and the off-campus speech and the school. 242 With cyberbullying, showing
this nexus should be easy for the school. The off-campus cyberbullying can be
reasonably forecasted to cause substantial disruption within the school if the victim
demonstrates effects such as insecurity at the school, fearfulness, or depression. 243
Since empirical evidence shows that this will negatively impact the victim’s ability
to perform at school, administrators can point to academic harm as disruption. 244
Further, there is a connection between the speech and the school, because the
students likely initially met in the schoolyard, see each other at school, and are
forced to interact within the confines of the classroom environment. It is possible
that there are confrontations between the two parties on school grounds as well as
in cyberspace. The cyberbully also likely gains insight into what he can use to
bully his victims inside the classroom, even if he chooses to wait until after hours
to perpetrate his acts.
Therefore, if the victim experiences some of the severe effects associated with
cyberbullying, such as severe depression or fearfulness for safety among others, it
is likely that the school will be able to step in. Because the school will be able to
reasonably forecast disruption under Tinker, and show a nexus between the speech
and school, if required, they will not violate the First Amendment rights of the cyberbully by stopping his or her speech.
2. Off-Campus Cyberbullying Impinges on the Rights of Other Students to
Learn in a Safe Environment Within the School
As with Tinker’s disruption test, school administrators may try to use the impinging on the rights of others test to curtail student cyberbullying. The case for
________________________

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Parts II.B.1, III.D.1.
See supra Part I.B (describing the effects of cyberbullying).
Id.
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school authority to discipline cyberbullies is actually stronger under this prong of
Tinker than disruption. In actuality, because of its unique effects on victims and
the holdings of prior cases, cyberbullying seems to be the perfect vehicle for widespread acceptance of this prong of Tinker.
The T-shirts worn in Harper and Nixon were passive speech directed at a
school-wide audience, stating a general opinion on a controversial topic. Comparatively, cyberbullying statements are directed specifically at a victim, inflicting various effects that are natural outgrowths of the bully’s act.245 The effects from the
targeted statements are much more harmful than any effects experienced by observers of the T-shirts’ blanket statements.246
Harper provides educators with additional support, in holding that students
have a right to be “secure from both physical and psychological attacks” which
“interfere with their opportunity to learn.”247 Cyberbullying is just such a psychological attack as was contemplated under Harper, affecting the victim’s very selfesteem, security, and ability to continue existing relationships.248 Regardless of
whether the cyberbullying acts occur on- or off-campus, many students clearly
carry those effects with them into school. School administrators can point to dropping grades as an interference with the victim’s ability to learn while at school.
Nixon noted that this impingement claim rested on the rights of other students
to be “secure and let alone.”249 Cyberbullying victims both attempt to avoid school
and become preoccupied with avoiding their harasser because they feel as vulnerable to additional attacks at school as they do at home, and fear for their safety. 250
Furthermore, unlike Harper and Nixon schools do not wish to curtail student cyberbullying because of any controversial content in the speech. 251 Rather, the
schools’ curtailment is to ensure the well-being of other students, and is based on
empirical evidence showing that victims of cyberbullying feel unsafe at school. 252
However, both Harper and Nixon involved speech occurring inside the school,
unlike instances of cyberbullying, which generally occur off-campus. Thus, the
school must utilize the Supreme Court’s decision in Morse, which demonstrated
the unclear boundary between on- and off-campus speech, along with technology,
which only further blurs that line. 253 Under such an analysis, schools can argue that
________________________

245.
Id.
246.
While the statements on the student T-shirts in these cases are offensive, particularly to students belonging in the group to which the message applies, targeted statements will cause students much more embarrassment and humiliation. Instead of being passive speech, the directed statements involved in cyberbullying make
victims feel specifically victimized and inferior, which leads to more severe consequences than the offense taken
to derogatory blanket statements.
247.
Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
248.
See supra Part I.B.
249.
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S.
1262 (2007).
250.
See supra Part I.B.
251.
See supra Part II.B.2. Plaintiffs in both cases alleged that the defendant schools curtailed their speech
because of the political and social controversy surrounding homosexuality and abortion.
252.
See id.
253.
See supra Parts II.A and IV.B.2.
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this distinction between on- and off-campus speech is irrelevant to the cyberbullying analysis, strengthening their use of Harper and Nixon.254
If the school can show that these effects interfere with the rights of students to
feel safe at school or perform academically, then it should be able to discipline a
cyberbully for off-campus acts under the second prong of the Tinker test. However, since the disruption test is more universally accepted than Tinker’s impingement
on the rights of others analysis, schools would be advised to justify curtailment first
under the disruption prong if they are so able.
CONCLUSION
Problems with cyberbullying are growing exponentially with the increased
availability of technology throughout the day, along with the constant accessibility
to others that such technology brings.255 It is in the best interests of all parties for
the courts to adopt a test that schools can use to curtail student cyberbullying, even
when such acts occur off-campus. Tinker, because of its widespread acceptance
and adaptability to both cyberspeech and off-campus student speech, will provide
educators with a well-established line of precedence which they can use in determining whether they can constitutionally curtail student speech. 256 It is time for the
courts to recognize that the law has failed to keep pace with technology and adopt
measures to protect today’s students.

________________________

254.
255.
256.

See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Introduction and Part I.
See supra Part IV.B.
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